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NLRB Regulation of Campaign Tactics:





The process by which a single union is selected to represent all em-
ployees in a particular unit is crucial to the American system of collective
bargaining. If a majority vote for union representation, all employees are
bound by that choice and the employer is obligated to recognize and bar-
gain with the chosen union. The selection process is controlled by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act,' which applies to almost all nongovernment
employees,' and takes place primarily through elections conducted by the
National Labor Relations Board.'
Typically, union representation elections are preceded by a campaign
-much like a political campaign--in which the union tries to persuade
employees to vote for union representation and the employer tries to per-
suade them to vote against it. The Board has developed an elaborate sys-
tem of rules" to govern campaign tactics:
0 This is the first of two articles based on an empirical study of voting behavior in NLRB elec-
tions conducted by Professors Getman, Goldberg and Herman. The study was funded by the Na-
tional Science Foundation and the Russell Sage Foundation. Financial support was also provided by
the American Bar Foundation by providing a Visiting Scholarship for academic years 1974-75 to
Professor Goldberg. The basic methodology of the study is set out in Getman, Goldberg & Herman,
The National Labor Relations Board Voting Study: A Preliminary Report, i J. Lao. STUD. 233 (1972).
The second article will deal with some of the study's findings. The authors wish to thank Professor
Bernard Meltzer, Professor Harry Triandis, Janet and Melvin Kohn, Melvin J. Welles and Robert Wil-
liams for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
t B.A. 1951, C.C.N.Y.; LL.B. 1958, LL.M. 1963, Harvard University. Professor of Law, Indiana
University.
$ B.A. 1954, LL.B. 1959, Harvard University. Professor of Law, Northwestern University, Affili-
ated Scholar, American Bar Foundation.
§ B.A. x967, Southern Methodist University; A.M. x969, Ph.D. 1972, University of Illinois.
Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of Michigan.
1. 29 U.S.C. §9 141-87 (1970).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2)-(3) (1970).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 359(a), (c)(i) (3970). The largest groups not covered by the National Labor
Relations Act are agricultural employees, domestic employees, and employees in industries subject to
the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970). In the decade from 1964-1973, the National
Labor Relations Board conducted approximately 85,000 elections, in which over five million workers
voted. 38 NLRB ANN. REP. 225 (973); 37 NLRB ANN. RaP. 242 (1972); 36 NLRB ANN. REP.
168 (197); 35 NLRB ANN. REP. x72 (970); 34 NLRB ANse. REP. 215 (x969); 33 NLRB ANN.
REP. 218 (x968); 32 NLRB ANN. REP. 234 (3967); 31 NLRB ANN. REP. 202 (1966); 30 NLRB
ANN. REP. 193 (3965); 29 NLRB ANN. RaEP. 183 (1964). In 1973 alone, over 9,000 elections took
place, with more than one-half million people voting on the question of union representation. 38
NLRB ANN. REP. 225 (i973)-
4. These rules have been established by Board case law. The Board possesses authority to
1465
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
The Board has said that in election proceedings it seeks to provide a laboratory in
which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as pos-
sible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees. [General Shoe Corp.,
77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127.] Where for any reason the standard falls too low the Board
will set aside the election and direct a new one. Unsatisfactory conditions for hold-
ing elections may be created by promises of benefits [International Shoe Co., 123
N.L.R.B. 682], threats of economic reprisals [L.C. Ferguson and E.F. Seggern,
d/b/a Shovel Supply Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1485], deliberate misrepresentations of
facts by an employer [United States Gypsum Co., 13o N.L.R.B. 9oi] or a union
[The Gummed Products Co., 11 N.L.R.B. io92], deceptive campaign tactics by
a union [Heintz Division, Kelsey-Hayes Co., x26 N.L.R.B. 151], or by a general
atmosphere of fear and confusion caused by a participant or by members of the
general public [P.D. Gwaltney & Co., 71 N.L.R.B. 371 ].5
The Board enforces its rules relating to campaign conduct in two ways.
The losing party may file objections to conduct allegedly affecting the out-
come of the election; if the Board finds such objections valid, it will set aside
the election and order a new one.6 Alternatively, the loser may file an un-
fair labor practice charge, alleging that the winning party has interfered
with the right of employees to "bargain collectively through representa-
tives of their own choosing."7 Interference with this right constitutes an
unfair labor practice which the Board is empowered to remedy by ordering
the offending party, employer or union, to cease the forbidden practice.8
The Board also possesses the power, if it deems the interference with em-
ployee choice sufficiently serious, to order an offending employer to recog-
nize the union as the representative of his employees and bargain with it
even though the union lost the election.9
An unfair labor practice almost always will constitute grounds for
setting aside the election.±' In addition, "[c]onduct that creates an atmo-
promulgate rules under the procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, but has not done so.
See Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 79 YA-. L.J. 571 (1970).
5. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 69-7o (1962). See also Modine Mfg. Co., 203 N.L.R.B.
No. 77 at 10 (May x6, i973) ("We . . . have thus opted for safeguards more rigorous than those
applied in the arena of democratic procedures which lie at the very heart of our form of government.").
6. The Board's authority to promulgate election rules, and to enforce them by setting aside any
election in which they have been violated, was nowhere spelled out in the original National Labor Re-
lations Act, which, in § 9(c), stated only, "Whenever a question . . . arises concerning the repre-
sentation of employees, the Board may . . . certify . . . the representatives that have been desig-
nated or selected." Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 9(c), 49 Stat. 449 (1935). The Board's power to
set aside an election it deems to have been unfairly conducted has, however, long been assumed. See
Miami Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Local 46 v. McCulloch, 322 F.2d 993, 997-98 (D.C. Cir.
1963), and cases cited therein.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). The power to file such charges is technically open to either party,
but it will rarely, if ever, be utilized by the winner.
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (i), 158(b) (I), x6o(c) (1970).
9. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969). A bargaining order may also be issued
when no election has been held. Thus, if the union believes it has little or no chance of winning an
election due to the employer's unfair practices, it may prefer to withdraw its election petition and
rely solely on unfair labor practice charges to achieve bargaining rights. See id. at 58o-8i.
io. Dal-Tex Optical CO., i37 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1787 (i962).
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sphere which renders improbable a free choice will sometimes warrant in-
validating an election, even though that conduct may not constitute an un-
fair labor practice."" Tactics which fall into this category include those
which are thought to impede a reasoned choice, such as misrepresentations
of fact or law or appeals to racial prejudice.m ' The Board thus possesses the
power, either through objections proceedings or unfair labor practice pro-
ceedings, to regulate a broad spectrum of pre-election conduct.
Board regulation traditionally has been defended by reference to the
Board's expert ability to determine which campaign tactics are likely to
interfere with employee freedom of choice. The Board has claimed such
expertise 3 and the courts have generally acquiesced in this claim.' In re-
cent years, however, courts and commentators have begun to challenge the
assumption of Board expertise, pointing out that the source of the Board's
'presumed special knowledge has never been identified. Judge Skelly
Wright described the Board as "an institution which in over 30 years has
itself never engaged in the kind of much needed systematic empirical
effort to determine the dynamics of an election campaign or the type of
conduct which actually has a coercive impact."'" Moreover, the Board has
not required, or even permitted, the introduction of evidence as to whether
particular conduct had a harmful impact on the employees involved in
a given campaign. 6 Thus, the Board's findings of unfair labor practices or
coercive campaign tactics are not grounded on data as to employee voting
behavior, but on assumptions implicit in various Board rules.
II. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (948).
12. See R. WILLAas, P. JA.Nus & K. HUHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION CONDUCT 19-25,
93-99 (1974).
z3. See, e.g., General Stencils, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 11o9, iiii (z972), in which the Board set
out "to draw upon [its] knowledge and expertise in evaluating the effects of any misconduct .... "
In Modine fg. CO., 203 N.L.R.B. No. 77 at 15 (May z6, 1973), the Board claimed the ability to
"take into account the current degree of sophistication of the voters at a particular time or in a
particular area of the country." See also General Electric Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247, 1251 (1966); Peer-
less Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
14. The Supreme Court has stated that the Board can take into account "imponderable sub-
tletices" in weighing the effect of employer speech on employee exercise of the right of self-organiza-
tion, NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power CO., 314 U.S. 469, 479 (1941), and that the Board is
capable of engaging in an "expert estimate as to the effects on the election process of unfair labor
practices of varying intensity," NLRB v. Gissel Packing CO., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969).
Cf. NLRB v. United Steelworkers Nutone, Inc., 357 U.S. 357, 362-64 (z958); NLRB v. Bab-
cock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 111-12 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S.
793, 798-800 (1945).
15. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.ad 670, 675 (D.C. Cir. X97). See Getman & Goldberg, The
Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 681 (1972). Cf. Bok, The Regulation of Cam-
pagn Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 Hzv. L. REv.
38, 46-53, 88-90 (1964); Lewis, Gissel Packing: Was the Supreme Court Right?, 56 A.B.A.J. 877
(1970); Note, Behavioral and Non-Behavioral Approaches to NLRB Representation Cases, 45 IND.
L.J. 276 (1970). See also Samoff, NLRB Elections: Uncertainty and Certainty, 117 U. PA. L. REv.
228 (1968). An early call for empirical research into the impact of campaign tactics is found in Sum-
mers, Politics, Policy Making and the NLRB, 6 S-AcusE L. Ray. 93, io6-o8 (1954)-
z6. "In evaluating the interference resulting from specific conduct, the Board does not attempt
to assess its actual effect on employees, but rather concerns itself with whether it is reasonable to
condude that the conduct tended to prevent the free formation and expression of the employee's
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Nothing in the collective activities or experience of the Board insures
the accuracy of these assumptions. To be sure, many of the Board's mem-
bers and staff have spent years interpreting and applying Board rules in
light of the policies, language, and legislative history of the National Labor
Relations Act. The process of elaborating and harmonizing rules of deci-
sion does not, however, provide an understanding of the behavioral validity
of the assumptions on which the decisions restY
The Board lacks any mechanism for determining the actual effect of the
tactics used in union representation elections. Empirical studies provide
such a mechanism, and some archival and field studies have indicated the
potential value of this approach. Unfortunately, past studies have been
either narrow in scope, 8 carried out by a participant in the elections
studied,19 or otherwise flawed.2" None of them provides the broadly based
empirical data necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of campaign tactics
used in union representation elections or the propriety of the Board's regu-
lation of those tactics. In an effort to provide the data appropriate for eval-
uating the validity of the Board's assumptions, we studied 3 Board elec-
tions. In designing the study, it was necessary to identify the behavioral as-
sumptions implicit in Board and court rulings. The article develops those
assumptions and compares them to the results of empirical research on vot-
ing in political elections, attitude change, and the effects of persuasive com-
munications.
choice." 33 NLRB ANN. REP. 6o (1968). See Shovel Supply Co., x18 N.L.R.B. 315, 316 (1957). Cf.
Modine Mfg. Co., 2o3 N.L.R.B. No. 77 at 10-14 (May i6, 1973). See also Murry Envelope Corp., 130
N.L.R.B. 1574, 1576 (196i); Lane Drug Stores, Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 584, 586 (195o).
17. Some Board members and staff have served as lawyers for employers or unions involved
in organizing campaigns, while others have been attorneys in NLRB Regional Offices, engaged in
investigating objections and unfair labor practice charges. Neither of these experiences, however, pro-
vides more than an impressionistic view of the impact of campaign tactics. As one commentator has
pointed out: "The Board's staff consists mostly of lawyers and a few researchers who are primarily
concerned with the statistics of the Board's own operations and with legal case analysis.. . . What
the Board lacks notably is (i) specific information about labor-management practices and employee
attitudes and reactions that may be pertinent to its work, and (2) any systematic means of monitor-
ing the impact of Board and court NLRB doctrines upon industrial practice. ... Thus, the Board's
decisionmaking fails to provide a bridge between Board members . . . and the real world of
labor relations." Bernstein, supra note 4, at 577-78 (footnote omitted).
18. Brotslaw, Attitude of Retail Workers Toward Union Organization, 18 LA. L.J. 149 (1967);
Field & Field, ". . . And Women Must Weep" v. "Anatomy of a Lie": An Empirical Assessment
of Two Labor Relations Propaganda Films, i PEaE~amaE L. REv. 21 (1973); Comment, An Exam-
ination of Two Aspects of the NLRB Representation Election: Employee Attitudes and Board In-
ferences, 3 AKRON L. REV. 218 (1970).
19. E.g., San Fernando Valley State College Political Science Department, A Survey of Voters
in National Labor Relations Board Elections (unpublished report prepared for the Los Angeles and
Orange Counties Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO) (1968).
20. See Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, supra note 15, at 691-94
(discussing Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. RV. 209 (1963)); Blackman,
Relative Severity of Employer Unfair Labor Practices, 22 LA. L.J. 67 (i97i). See also Roy, The
Role of the Researcher in the Study of Sodal Conflict: A Theory of Protective Distortion of Re-
sponse, 24 HumAN ORGANIZATION 262 (1965).
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I. TI- CONCEPT OF A FREE AND REASONED CHOICE:
AN IMPLICIT MODEL OF VOTING BHA Vo R
The Board has frequently stated that its objective in regulating the pre-
election campaign is to protect employee freedom of choice.!1 By "freedom
of choice" the Board means the opportunity of exercising a "reasoned, un-
trammeled choice"" for or against union representation. Board opinions
assume that in a properly conducted election, employees will make a
"sober and thoughtful choice' '22 based on the arguments for and against
union representation, reserving their final decision until the campaign
ends. In this respect, the Board assumes, or at least seeks to encourage, a
model of employee voting behavior similar to that once thought to prevail
in political elections; in theory, the political voter attends to the issues and
candidates and decides how to vote by weighing the campaign informa-
tion in light of his own and the country's best interests.
While a campaign preceding a political election is generally free of re-
strictions on campaign tactics, the Board, explicitly rejecting this aspect of
the political analogy, has opted for stringent regulation of campaign con-
duct' The decision to regulate closely was a natural outgrowth of the
historical circumstances and economic philosophy which led to passage of
the National Labor Relations Act.!' The decades preceding passage of the
Act were marked by stormy efforts to organize employees in major in-
dustries. Employers often sought to defeat unionization by capitalizing on
their economic power over employees. The techniques employed included
mass discharges, yellow dog contracts, and company unions.2 6 In response
to the use of such tactics, the framers of the Act," who sought to "encourage
by developing the procedure of collective bargaining, ...equality of bar-
gaining power,"2 established unfair labor practice procedures. They
hoped thereby to overcome "the relative weakness of the isolated wage
earner."2 0 In this context it was probably inevitable that the Board would
reject the model of unregulated political elections and seek to prevent em-
21. See, e.g., General Shoe Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 126 (1948).
22. Sewell lfig. Co., 138 N.L.B. 66, 69 (1962). See R. ,VsiLLmis, P. JANUs & K. HUHN, supra
note 12, at 19-23.
23. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (2953).
24. Sewell Mfg. Co., 238 N.L.R.B. 66,69-70 (1962).
25. See, e.g., Rockford Mitten & Hosiery Co., 16 N.L.R.B. 501 (1939).
26. See A. Cox & D. BoK, CAsES AND MATEnLs oN LAoR LAw, 92-98 (7th ed. x969).
27. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., ist Sess. 8--1 (1935).
28. Id. at 3.
29. The framers of the Wagner Act were also concerned with less obvious attempts to use the
employer's economic power: "It is impossible to catalog all the practices that might constitute inter-
ference, which may rest upon subtle but conscious economic pressure exerted by virtue of the em-
ployment relationship." Id. at 2o.
30. Id. at 3.
NuY 1975]
STANFORD LAW REVIEW
ployers from relying upon the threat or use of economic power to influence
employee voting decisions."
The Board also assumes that employees need protection from purely
emotional appeals if they are to be free to exercise a reasoned choice.32 The
Board has used the metaphor of "laboratory conditions" to describe the
atmosphere necessary for a fair union representation election. 3 The com-
parison with a laboratory suggests that an atmosphere of pristine calm and
purity is both attainable and necessary to determine the uninhibited de-
sires of the employees. Implicit in the Board's assumption that employees
must be protected against emotional appeals is the belief that some em-
ployees can make rational choices only in the absence of emotional appeals.
If these employees would make non-reasoned choices whether or not emo-
tional appeals are made, then governmental regulation aimed at maximiz-
ing the likelihood of a reasoned choice would be a fatuous undertaking.
Thus, the Board has adopted a model of employee voting behavior
adapted from the political ideal, while at the same time assuming that this
model can be realized in union representation elections only with govern-
mental protection. From these broad assumptions flow the Board's more
particularized assumptions.'
A. The Assumption That Employees Are Attentive to the Campaign
Many of the Board's rules presuppose that employees are paying close
attention to the campaign. This assumption is perhaps most noticeable in
Board cases setting aside elections due to misrepresentations of fact. For
example, in Haynes Stellite Co.," the Board set aside the election because
the employer made the following statement:
31. See text accompanying notes 63-85 infra. Because a union seeking representation rights will
not usually possess economic power vis- t-vis the employees involved, elections are rarely set aside on
the basis of such power being used improperly. But see NLRB v. Savair MfNg. Co., 414 U.S. 270
(1973), discussed in text accompanying note 132 infra. The economic pressure to accept unionization
that is exerted by organizational picketing is regulated by § 8(b) (7) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (7) (1970).
32. In furthering its goal of laboratory conditions, the Board has outlawed such tactics as ap-
peals to racial prejudice, redbaiting, and, on occasion, the showing of films portraying the harmful
effects of a strike. See notes 87-89, i9 infra and accompanying text.
33. The phrase "laboratory conditions" was used first in General Shoe Co., 77 NL.R.B. 124,
327 (3948), and has been used regularly since that time. See, e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 338 N.L.R.B. 66,
69 (3962).
34. Identifying the Board's assumptions is made difficult by several factors. First, the Board it-
self rarely articulates them. Second, the Board frequently sets out all the challenged campaign tac-
tics in a case, then asserts that the "totality" of those tactics was such as to interfere with free choice.
Cf. Arch Beverage Corp., 14o N.L.R.B. 1385, 1387 (x963); Bernstein, supra note 17, at 576. In such
cases it is difficult to determine precisely which conduct was objectionable, much less why. Finally, the
Board is not consistent; the same assumption is given different weight in different cases and, at times,
one assumption is discarded in favor of its opposite. See notes IO7-2o infra and accompanying text.
Nonetheless, certain assumptions can be identified as more or less central to the Board's regulation of
preelection campaign tactics.
35. 136 N.L.R.B. 95, enforcement denied sub nom., Union Carbide Corp. v. NLRB, 31o F.2d
844 (6th Cir. 3962).
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[In] some cases we are the sole source of supply at present for some of our cus-
tomers. We have been told that we would not continue to be the sole source of
supply if we become unionized, due to the ever present possibility of a work stop-
page due to strikes or walkouts.-"
One customer had so informed the company, but the Board found that by
using "some" instead of "one," the employer had materially misrepre-
sented the facts." In setting aside the election the Board assumed that em-
ployees would distinguish between the use of "one" and "some" and that
their vote might be affected by the difference. On other occasions the
Board has set aside elections because of a union's misstatement of the wage
rates at another firm38 and because of an employer's misrepresentation of
the amount of union dues that would be required of employees."
Elections will also be set aside when the employer misstates, however
slightly, the legal or practical implications of a union victory. For example,
an employer may state that a union victory will preclude his dealing di-
rectly with employees regarding their wages, hours, or working conditions.
However, if his statement implies that employees will be unable to present
grievances directly to him, the election will be set aside, since the right to
have grievances adjusted without the intervention of the bargaining rep-
resentative is protected by the first proviso to section 9(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act." Similarly, an employer is free to point out that a
strike is possible, indeed likely, if the union wins, but he may not convey
the impression that a strike is inevitable.41 Here too, the assumption is that
employees are attending to the campaign so closely that they will notice
the difference."'
36. 136 N.L.R.B. at 96-97.
37. Id. at 97.
38. Kawneer Co., I9 N.L.B. 346o (3958) (union claimed that wages were $x.8i per hour
when they actually ranged from $i.73 to $3.9o per hour).
39. In Trane Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 35o6 (3962), the employer deducted an amount from the em-
ployee's paychecks which he said was "the estimated amount" of monthly union dues and paid it in
a separate envelope. Since the employer deducted five dollars and the union dues were four dollars,
the Board found this to be a substantial misrepresentation that constituted partial grounds for set-
ting the election aside. Implicit in this holding is the assumption that some employees would note
the amount of money deducted, recall that amount when making their voting decision, and be in-
fluened by that recollection to vote differently than they otherwise would have. The Board sustained
the union's objection on the additional grounds that the employer had misrepresented the nature of
Tennessee's right-to-work law and that the distribution of literature on the eve of the election had
not given the union time to reply.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 359(a) (X970). See Saticoy Meat Packing Co., 182 N.L.R.B. 713, 714-15
(3970); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., x66 N.L.R.B. 227, 234 (3967); Graber Mfg. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 244,
246-47 (3966).
41. Unitec Industries, i8o N.L.R.B. 51, 52--53 (1969); Thomas Products Co., 367 N.L.R.B.
732,733 (x967).
42. As a corollary of the assumption of attentiveness, the Board assumes that employees will dis-
cuss employer actions among themselves. In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 34o N.L.R.B. x33
(x962), the employer operated x6 stores with approximately i2o employees. The area supervisor
asked five employees about the merits of unionization. The Board set aside the election, stating: "In-
dividual interviews took place in 25 percent of the total number of stores in the unit This is hardly
July 1975]
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B. The Assumption That Employees Will Interpret Ambiguous
Statements by the Employer as Threats or Promises
Employers are free to inform employees of their opposition to unionism
and frequently do so." However, when ambiguous statements about the
effect of unionism are made by the employer, the Board frequently assumes
that employees will infer threats of reprisal or promises of benefit. For
example, in Singer Co.' the employer stated that one of his chief reasons
for opening a plant in the particular community was to take advantage of
lower labor costs. He further stated that costs had risen at other plants after
unionization with the result that work had been transferred and nearly
I,ooo people had lost their jobs. Although the employer's comment could
have been interpreted as a legal prediction of the economic consequences
of unionization, the Board found the remarks contained an implied threat
of reprisal. In Thomas Products Co., the employer's constant reference to
strikes was found not to suggest that union intransigence might cause a
strike, but that the employer would take an unyielding bargaining stance,
forcing employees to strike to obtain benefits. This statement, too, was
seen as a threat of reprisal. In Rein Co.,4 the employer said that he was not
required to negotiate present benefits into a union contract, nor prohibited
from telling employees that such benefits could be discontinued. Although
these statements were legally accurate, they were found to threaten the
loss of existing benefits in retaliation for unionizationY
Questions as well as statements may contain implied threats of re-
prisal or promises of benefit. If the employer tries to find out which em-
ployees support the union, the Board assumes that, lacking specific safe-
guards, his questioning will be understood as a threat of reprisal against
union supporters 8 If the employer asks employees why they want a union,
an isolated number of interviews, and it is not unreasonable in the circumstances to infer, as we do,
that the ramifications of the interviewing technique extended beyond the employees immediately in-
volved." Id. at 135.
43. This freedom is guaranteed by the first amendment and, in unfair labor practice cases, by
§ 8(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970). Cf. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137
N.L.R.B. 1782 (1962).
44. gg N.L.B.LB. 1195 (1972).
45. 167 N.L.R.B. 732, 733 (x967).
46. 1i N.L.R.B. 537, 538-39 (1955).
47- See also Bok, supra note 15, at 77-82. The assumption that employer speech will be parsed
by the employees for indications of coercion has been applied by the Board even where the em-
ployer makes no statement about his reaction to unionization. In Tunica Mfg. Co., i8z N.LR.B. 729,
74, (,970) (trial examiner's decision, adopted by the Board), the Board held that a company car-
toon which showed hands above water grasping for a life preserver with the caption "Don't run the
risk" was likely to be considered a threat of retaliation.
48. See, e.g., Isaacson-Carrico Mfg. Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 788, (1972); Spartus Corp., 195 NI.R.B.
134 (1972); General Automation Mfg., Inc., 167 N.L.R.B. 5o2 (1967); Abex Corp., 162 NX.tLB.
328, 329 (1966); Standard Products Co., 159 N.L.R.B. 159, 169 (1966) (trial examiner's decision,
adopted by the Board). The safeguards necessary, in the Board's view, to render interrogation non-
coercive are: (i) the employer must communicate his purpose for the interrogation to the employees;
(2) the purpose must be legitimate; (3) the employees must be assured there will be no reprisals;
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or what their grievances are, the Board assumes the employees will infer
a promise to correct the grievances that prompted the effort to organize. 9
Surveillance of union activities is impermissible because it demonstrates
the employer's anxiety regarding unionization, thus causing the employees
to fear economic retaliation.' 9
C. The Assumption That Employees Are Unsophisticated
About Labor Relations
Many of the Board's decisions setting aside elections on the basis of em-
ployers' statements appear to rest on the assumption that employees know
little about labor-management relations or the effect of unionization on
such relations, and that nearly all their information on this subject will be
a product of the campaign. In Boaz Spinning Co t' the employer set out in
some detail the history of other plants (one of which he had operated) that
had closed after prolonged strikes called by a union seeking representation
rights. He discussed possible results of a strike, including loss of jobs, loss
of income, violence, bloodshed, and disruption of family and community
life. The Board set aside the election, lost by the union, on the ground that
the employer had unfairly given the employees the impression that their
only choice was between no union and a strike:
In arguing against unionism, an employer is free to discuss rationally the potency
of strikes as a weapon and the effectiveness of the Union seeking to represent his
employees. It is, however, a different matter when the employer leads the em-
ployees to believe that they must strike in order to get concessions. A major pre-
supposition of the concept of collective bargaining is that minds can be changed by
discussion, and that skilled, rational, cogent argument can produce change with-
out the necessity for striking.... Policy considerations dictate that employees
(4) there must be an overall background free of anti-union hostility. Blue Flash Express, Inc., xo9
N.L.R.B. 59x, 593-94 (E954)- If the interrogation is characterized as "polling," or systematic interro-
gation as to union preference, there are additional requirements that the poll be by secret ballot and
that its purpose be to determine the truth of a union's claim of majority. Struksnes Construction Co.,
x65 N.L.R.B. io62, io63 (1967).
49. See Flight Safety, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 223, 227-28 (x972); Reliance Electric Co., i91
N.L.R.B. 44, 46 (197); Raytheon Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 3r1, 312 (1971) (concurring opinion); Tom
Wood Pontiac, Inc., 179 N.L.R.B. 581 (x969); Texaco, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 434 (1969).
50. Hendrix Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 F.2d 100, 104 n.7 (5th Cir. 1963), enforcing 139
N.L.R.B. 397 (1962). Efforts by the employer to determine the identity of union supporters through
surveillance of union activities have been held unlawful, even when the employees involved are un-
aware of such surveillance. Elder-Beerman Stores Corp., 173 N.L.R.B. 566 (1968); Cannon Electric
Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1465, X468-69 (1965); Grower-Shipper Vegetable Ass'n of Central Cal., 15
N.L.tB. 322, 356 (939), enforced in part, 122 F.2d 368 (9 th Cir. 194); Bethlehem Steel Corp.,14 N.LLB. 539, 628 (1939), enforced, 12o F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 194). The theory on which secret
surveillance is forbidden is not that it will directly affect employee free choice, as it obviously can-
not, but that it is the first step leading to discriminatory actions against union supporters. Cannon
Electric Co., supra at x968-69. While the Board has found secret surveillance to be an unfair labor
practice, we are aware of no case in which it has set an election aside solely on the basis of secret sur-
veillance.
51. 177N.L.R.B. 788 (i969).
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should not be led to believe, before voting, that their choice is simply between no
union or striking. That narrow choice is essentially what this Employer gave
them.52
Implicit in the Board's decision is the assumption that the employees
had not previously considered the possibility of a strike and were unaware
of the possible negative consequences of striking. Also implied in the
Board's discussion is the assumption that employees will see their choice
solely as presented by the employer-no union or strike--and will be un-
aware that many employers who adamantly oppose unionization ulti-
mately accept a union contract rather than risk a damaging strike. 3
In Bausch & Lomb, Inc. 4 the employer stated that the union seeking to
represent the employees "agreed last November that the four [Bausch &
Lomb] employees represented by them will not receive a Christmas bonus.
The Union also agreed they will not get the new pension plan.""5 The
Board set aside the election because the company "created the false impres-
sion that the Minneapolis Local gave up the valuable right of the Minneap-
olis employees to receive the Christmas bonus without receiving anything
in return ... ."" In fact, the union had negotiated for new benefits. The
opinion assumes that employees will not know enough about collective bar-
gaining to recognize that existing benefits are generally surrendered in re-
turn for other benefits which the union considers more important.
The assumption that employees lack sophistication is also present in the
Board doctrine that an employer may not bargain with one union when a
rival union claim raises a question concerning representation under the
ActY Bargaining with one union, the Board has said, bestows an "unwar-
ranted prestige" on the recognized union and thereby prevents a free choice
by the employees. 8 The Board's theory must be that substantial prestige
will accrue to the recognized union due to its position of authority in the
plant. Union leaders will be dealing with management officials with respect
to grievances and the negotiation of an agreement; from these dealings the
union will acquire an aura of responsibility giving it a significant ad-
vantage over rivals in a forthcoming election. This theory presupposes that
employees will be so impressed by the union's acting in a responsible role
that they will be unable to consider the likelihood that another union could
do likewise. Hence, they are deprived of freedom of choice.5
52. Id. at 789.
53. See Ideal Baking Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 546, 551-52 (x963). Cf. Utica-Herbrand Tool Div. of
Kelsey-Hayes Co., 145 N.L.R.B. x717 (x964).
54. 185 N.L.R.B. 262 (1970).
55. Id. at 264.
56. Id. at 262.
57. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. io6o, 1070 (1945).
58. Scherrer & Davisson Logging Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1587, 1588-89 (1958).
59. See Getman, The Midwest Piping Doctrine: An Example of the Need for Reappraisal of
Labor Board Dogma, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 292, 309 (1964).
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The assumption of unsophistication, even if accurate, could not justify
setting aside elections without still another assumption-that the impact
of such tactics cannot be neutralized by the union. If the employer threatens
to close the plant contingent on a union victory, presumably the union or-
ganizer will respond that the employer will not do so as long as the plant
is profitable, and that the union has no intention of making it unprofitable.
If the employer promises to raise wages contingent on a union loss, un-
doubtedly the organizer will reply that mere words are not equal to a
union contract If the employer recognizes one union, the other will counter
that the favored union is an employer puppet and that the unrecognized
union will negotiate a more favorable contract. The Board must assume
either that employees will not attend to the union's counterassertions or
that the impact of the employer's threatened use of his economic power vis-
A-vis employees is so great that counterassertions will be ineffective. Hence,
self-policing of the campaign by the parties is ruled out and governmental
regulation is deemed necessary."
D. The Assumption That Free Choice Is Fragile
The Board assumes that an employee's decision to vote for or against
union representation is tenuous and easily altered by the campaign. This
assumption is so inherent in Board regulation that it is rarely articulated,
save when the Board discusses those tactics it considers particularly effec-
tive in unfairly influencing voting. Foremost among these impermissible
tactics are threats and acts of reprisal, and promises and grants of bene-
fits. The Board has concluded that such tactics impress employees with the
employer's economic power over them and thus interfere with their free
choice. This conclusion rests on two further assumptions: (i) unless re-
minded of the employer's economic power during the campaign, employees
will not fully appreciate its meaning or consider the possibility of its exer-
cise; (2) once reminded of that power, employees will be inclined to vote
against the union. Implicit in the second assumption is the conclusion that
employees otherwise contemplating a vote for union representation will
vote against the union either to prevent the employer from exercising his
economic power in ways harmful to them or to encourage him to exercise
that power in ways favorable to them. Many Board decisions reflect these
assumptions.
i. Threats and acts of reprisal.
Of all reminders of employer power, threatened or actual loss of em-
ployment is considered among the most coercive. In Cornelius American,
6o. The rejection of self-regulation is not absolute. The Board stated in Hollywood Ceramics
Co., 14o N.L.R.B. 221, 224 (1962), that it would not set aside an election despite misrepresentations
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Inc.61 the Board held that actual reprisals, even against a single worker,
would invalidate an election.62 Threats, even when implicit, are also
thought to have great impact if the speaker is in a position to effectuate
them. Thus, in Thomas Products Co.," the president of the parent com-
pany of the employer involved in the election made a speech in which he
stated that the operations of the employer had not been successful and that
other plants that had not succeeded had been closed, including one which
had endured one union turmoil after another. He also told the employees,
"I am a businessman and I have to make business decisions."6 The Board
found his comments likely to coerce employees into voting against the
union in order to prevent retaliation. The Board's assumptions in setting
aside the election were clearly stated:
Power can persuade, and substantial power can persuade substantially. When an
employer who controls a multiplant operation stands before employees and ver-
bally juggles the factories, blithely reminding them of his ability to dose this, that,
or the other one, it is a display of enormous economic power, calculated to put the
fear of unemployment in the minds of employees. Such a demonstration is un-
necessary to a reasoned discussion of the pros and cons of unionism and can only
tend to make employees believe that, should they incur the employer's displeasure,
he could easily find a formidable way to express his dissatisfaction. 5
In General Stencils, Inc." the Board went a step further and issued a bar-
gaining order based upon a threat of discharge 7
2. Promises and grants of benefits.
Promises or grants of benefits made to discourage union support are
considered exceedingly potent, whether or not made contingent on the
union's defeat. For example, the Board stated in Hudson Hosiery Co.:"
[T]he presentation of economic benefits to employees in order to have them forego
collective bargaining is a form of pressure and compulsion no less telling in its
effect on employees because benign.... We can perceive no logical distinction
between threats to withdraw economic benefits, for the purpose of thwarting
self-organization of employees, and promises of better things to come, for the
same objective.
What is unlawful under the Act is the employer's granting or announcing
made by the winner unless, inter alia, these misrepresentations are made "at a time which precludes
the other party or parties from making an effective reply .... " Apparently, the Board assumes
that the impact of misrepresentations on voting choice can be neutralized by counterrepresentations,
but the impact of other types of campaign propaganda cannot.
6I. i94 N.L.R.B. 909 (1972).
62. Id. at 920.
63. i67 NL.R.B. 732 (1967).
64. Id. at 733.
65. id. CfI. Graber Mfg. Co., 158 N.L.R.B. 244, 247-49 (1966).
66. 195 N.L.R.B. 33o9 (1972).
67. "A direct threat of loss of employment . . . is one of the most flagrant means by which an
employer can hope to dissuade employees from selecting a bargaining representative." Id. at xio9.
68. 72 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1947).
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such benefits (although previously determined bona fide) for the purpose of
causing the employees to accept or reject a representative for collective bargain-
ing.6"
Frequently, the grant of benefits is held to exert so powerful an influence
on employee free choice that the Board issues a bargaining order on the
theory that setting the contaminated election aside and holding another
would be futile'
The theory on which promises or grants of benefits are assumed to in-
terfere with rational decisionmaking has never been fully articulated by
the Board. In NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co."1 the Supreme Court found
an implicit threat of reprisals in the bestowal of benefits:
The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a
fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the
source of benefits now conferred is also the source from which future benefits
must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged. a
The Board has in some cases, by citing Exchange Parts,"' suggested a
wholly different explanation for treating grants and promises of benefits
as illegal. In Texas Transport & Terminal Co.,' the employer threatened
reprisals and granted wage increases to discourage union support. The
Board commented: "The threats were the stick, the grant of wage increases
the carrot.' ' The Board's theory in this case would thus appear to be that
by granting benefits, the employer is attempting to win favor among em-
ployees and to persuade them that they will receive satisfactory wages and
working conditions without the assistance of the union."6
The vice of a last-minute grant of benefits that attempts to demonstrate
that employees do not need a union to assure favorable treatment is by no
means clear. One theory on which such conduct might be held unlawful is
suggested by the court's statement in Exchange Parts that "[t]he benef-
icence of an employer is likely to be ephemeral if prompted by a threat of
69. Id. at 1436-37 (footnote omitted). Accord, Bata Shoe Co., ix6 N.L.R.B. 1239, 1241-42
(X956); Lake Superior Dist. Power Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1496, 1498 (1950). As the quoted language
indicates, the Board has never distinguished between the promise and the grant of benefits, nor has
it distinguished promises of benefits contingent upon a union defeat and promises made in absolute
terms. Indeed, even if the employer decides upon the grant of benefits in advance of the campaign
for reasons having nothing to do with unionization, their announcement during the campaign will
generally constitute an unfair labor practice. Hineline's Meat Plant, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 867 (I97I).
70. In issuing a bargaining order in one such case, the Board stated: "There are few unfair
labor practices so effective in cooling employees' enthusiasm for a union than the prompt remedy
of the grievances which prompted the employees' union interest in the first place." International Har-
vester Co., 179 N.L.R.B. 753, 753-54 (1969). See also Texaco, Inc., 178 N.L.R.B. 434 (i969), en-forced, 436 F.2d 52o (7th Cir. 1971), in which a bargaining order was predicated on an employer's
solicitation and adjustment of grievances.
71. 375 U.S. 405 (x964).
72. Id. at 409 (footnote omitted).
73. See, e.g., Hineline's Meat Plant, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 867 (I971).
74. 187 N.L.R.B. 466 (197o).
75. Id. at 468.
76. See also Bok, supra note z5, at 113.
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unionization which is subsequently removed."77 In other words, a last-
minute grant of benefits for the purpose of discouraging union activity
may represent only the employer's response to the immediate prospect of
unionization rather than a long-range policy of maintaining a high level
of benefits. Because of their assumed lack of sophistication, the employees
will be unaware of the ephemeral nature of the last-minute grant of bene-
fits, and hence will be misled into believing that unionization is unneces-
sary to secure future benefits7
While only those grants of benefit that the employer intends to influence
employee voting choice are unlawful, the employer's intent need not be
communicated explicitly to the employees in order to have the desired in-
fluence. For example, in Texas Transport & Terminal Co.," the employer
decided to give a wage increase during the campaign. The Board found
that the timing of the increase was influenced by the campaign. Although
the employer did not couple the announcement of the increase with the
campaign in any way, the Board assumed that the employees would make
the connection on their own.8"
Even when a change is decided upon for business reasons unrelated to
unionization if it is announced during the campaign it is assumed that em-
ployees will regard it as a response to their efforts to organize.8 "
3. Other reminders of employer power.
The Board's view of the fragility of rational decisionmaking is further
demonstrated by cases holding that certain forms of employer campaign-
ing are so potent that they are inconsistent with freedom of choice regard-
77. 375 U.S. at 41o. This statement was triggered by the Court of Appeals' suggestion that en-
forcement of the Board's order would have the "ironic" result of "discouraging benefits for labor."
304 F.2d 368, 376 (5th Cir. 1962).
78. See Bok, supra note 15, at 114. This analysis would be inapplicable to cases such as Hine-
line's Meat Plant, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 867 (1971), in which the Board relied on Exchange Parts in
finding unlawful a last-minute announcement of new benefits which the employer had previously de-
cided to grant for reasons other than to thwart unionism. While the employer was found to have
timed the announcement of the new benefits to achieve maximum impact on employee voting be-
havior, there was little reason to suppose, regardless of the timing of the announcement, that bene-
fits granted for reasons unrelated to the threat of unionization would not survive the employees' deci-
sion with respect to unionization.
Still another theory on which a last-minute grant or promise of benefits might be held unlawful
is that the employees will be so enthralled by the immediacy of such benefits that they will be unable
to put them in proper perspective.
79. 187 N.L.R.B. 4 66 (1970).8o. It stated: "In our experience, an employer rarely couples a wage increase intented [sic] to
affect employee desires during an organizational campaign with an explicit avowal of such purpose.
The absence of such a statement does not make the announcement lawful however.. .. Employees
are well able to understand the purpose of well-timed grants of benefit without being told by their
grantor that the increases are intended to dissuade them from unionization." Id. at 468.
81. See Hineline's Meat Plant, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 867 (197). So, too, the Board assumes that
actions detrimental to employees, if taken for the purpose of discouraging unionization, will he
understood by them to serve that purpose even if it is not made explicit. See Great Southwest Ware-
houses, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 645, 647 (1970).
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less of the content of the statements made. In General Shoe Corp.2 the
company's general manager and the personnel manager met in their offices
with small groups of employees to urge them to vote against the union.
Their statements were found to be moderate in tone but the Board still
set aside the election because they were made in the "locus of final author-
- ,83ity.
Home visits by the employer for the purpose of campaigning against the
union are also prohibited. In Peoria Plastics Co.8" the Board equated such
visits with calling employees into the employer's office individually and
concluded that they interfered with free choice, regardless of whether the
employer's remarks were coercive."'
4. Interference with free choice unrelated to employer power.
The freedom of employees to vote for or against union representation
is thought to be vulnerable to a variety of campaign tactics that do not trade
upon the employer's economic power over the employees, but that none-
theless prevent employees from acting in a rational and nonemotional
fashion. All campaign speeches on working time to massed assemblies of
employees within 24 hours of the election are prohibited because such
speeches "have an unwholesome and unsettling effect and tend to inter-
fere with ... sober and thoughtful choice.""8
Appeals to racial prejudice, when regarded by the Board as inflamma-
tory, are proscribed because "[t]hey create conditions which make impos-
sible a sober, informed exercise of the franchise."" Similarly, linking the
trade union movement to communism may be a basis for setting aside an
election. 8 Even statements made by outside parties unrelated to the em-
ployer or the union may provide a basis for setting aside an election if the
82. 97 N.L.R.B. 499 (1951).
83. Id. at 502. "When rank-and-file employees are brought to the company offices in small
groups, they do not deal in 'arm's length' relationship with the company officials they are directed
to see. Anti-union opinions, and the suggestion that the employees reject the union, when uttered in
that locus of final authority in the plant, take on a meaning and significance they do not possess under
other circumstances." Id. See Peoples Drug Stores, Inc., Ui9 N.L.R.B. 634, 635-36 (957). But see
NVF Co., 21o N.L.R.B. No. 99 at 3-5 (May 2o, 1974). The Board also assumes that the impact of
the employer's statements will be greater when there are few employees present to hear his state-
ments than when there are many, presumably because they will feel more isolated. Tuttle & Kift, 122
N.L.R.B. 848, 849 (1959).
84. 117 N.L.R.B. 545, 547 (1957)-
85. Home visits by unions are permissible because the union does not have control over tenure
of employment and working conditions. Plant City Welding & Tank Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 131, 133-34
(1957). The right to engage in home visits for unions is also deemed important because "unions often
do not have the opportunity to address employees in assembled or informal groups." Id. at 133.
86. Peerless Plywood Co., 1o7 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953).
87. Sewell Mfg. Co., X38 N.L.R.B. 66, 71 (x962). A racial message that is truthful, germane
and noninflammatory will be allowed. Id. at 70-71.
88. Universal Nffg. Corp., z56 N.L.R.B. 1459, 1466 (1966).
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Board concludes that these statements created an atmosphere in which ra-
tional decisionmaking could not take place.89
Some rules appear to be based on both the Board's desire to protect its
processes and its assumption of the fragility of free choice. Thus, the dis-
tribution of a facsimile of an official ballot marked to suggest that the Board
endorses a particular choice is grounds for setting aside an election,"0 as is
the addition of a partisan message to an official Board notice entitled
"Rights of Employees." 1 Sustained conversation with prospective voters
waiting to cast their ballots is prohibited to maintain order in the polling
area and to prevent last-minute distraction and pressures on employees so
that they may "consult their own consciences without interference.""
E. The Assumption That Limited Union Campaigning
on Company Premises Is Adequate
Proceeding from its assumption that the campaign affects voting be-
havior, the Board has sought to insure that the union has an adequate op-
portunity to reach employees with its campaign 5 It was settled quite early
in the administration of the National Labor Relations Act that an adequate
union opportunity to communicate requires that employees be free to solicit
on behalf of the union during nonworking time on company premises. 4
It has been more difficult to resolve whether adequacy of union commu-
nication requires: (i) that nonemployee organizers be allowed to solicit
on company premises and (2) that the union be allowed an opportunity to
respond, on company time and premises, to anti-union speeches delivered
by the employer on company time and premises (known as "captive audi-
ence" speeches). As to both, decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that
the appropriate test is whether the employer's refusal to allow union com-
munication on his premises "truly diminishe[s] the ability of the labor or-
ganizations involved to carry their messages to the employees" or creates an
"imbalance in the opportunities for organizational communication.""
89. In Universal Mfg. Corp., id., an election was set aside on the basis of newspaper ads, edi-
torials, a cartoon and a handbill reproduction of that cartoon. The Board stated: "By appealing to the
employees' sentiments as civic minded individuals, injecting the fear of personal economic loss, and
playing on racial prejudice, the full-page ads, the editorials, the cartoon, and the handbill were cal-
culated to convince the employees that a vote for the Union meant betrayal of the community's best
interests. Faced with pressure of this sort, the employees in our opinion were inhibited from freely
exercising their choice in the election." Id. at 1466. See Automotive Controls Corp., 165 N.L.R.B. 450,
462 (1967); Monarch Rubber Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 81, 83 (1958). Cf. P.D. Gwaltney Jr. & Co., 74
N.L.R.B. 37X, 378 (1947).
9o.Allied Electric Products, Inc., 1o9 N.L.R.B. 1270, 1271-72 (i954).
9i.Rebmar, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1968).
92. Milchem, Inc., 17o N.L.R.B. 362,363 (1970).
93. The employer, through his ability to communicate with employees during working hours, is
assumed to possess this opportunity without the need for Board intervention.
94. Republic Aviation Corp., 5i N.L.R.B. 1186, 1195 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 193 (2d
Cir. 1944), af'd, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). See Gale Products, 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1249 (1963), en-
forcement denied, 337 F.2d 390 ( 7 th Cir. 1964).
95. NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America (Nutone, Inc.), 357 U.S. 357, 362-63 (1958).
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While the stated tests appear to pose somewhat different issues-ade-
quacy of union opportunity to communicate as compared to equality of op-
portunity-the Board's response has been the same. Except in unusual cir-
cumstances, such as when employees are isolated because they work on a
ship, an inaccessible island, or a resort hotel.." the Board has rejected union
demands for access to company premises by nonemployee organizers,
whether to solicit generally or to respond to an anti-union speech." The
Board assumes that unions generally have adequate opportunity to present
their views to employees by means of employee solicitation on company
premises combined with traditional off-premise channels of communica-
tion, such as letters, telephone calls, and union meetings!'
F. Assumptions About Authorization Card Signing as an
Indication of Employee Choice
Board rules provide that an election will be held only if the union sub-
mits evidence that at least 30 percent of the employees wish union repre-
sentation. 9 Accordingly, the union will almost invariably commence its
organizing drive by asking employees to sign cards authorizing it to repre-
sent them in negotiating with the employer as to wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment."'
If the union collects authorization cards from a majority of employees,
it may, under certain circumstances, obtain an order directing the employer
to bargain without first holding an election or even after losing an elec-
tion. 1 The Board issues comparatively few such orders, preferring to rely
on elections as the prime determinant of employee choice.0 Indeed, an
See NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (I956), in which the Court stated the test
for accessibility of nonunion organizers to be whether their exclusion places employees "beyond the
reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them .... "
96. Sioux City & New Orleans Barge Lines, Inc., i93 N.L.R.B. 382, enforcement denied, 472
F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1973) (ship); Alaska Barite Co., 197 N.L.R.B. 1023 (1972) (isolated island);
S & H Grossinger's, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 233 (1965) (resort hotel).
97. See R. WLis, P. JANus & K. Hums, supra note i, at 287-9o. Such access has been al-
lowed when the employer maintains an unlawfully broad no-solicitation rule, Montgomery Ward
& Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 846, 849 (1964), or a broad, but privileged, rule, May Dept. Stores Co., 136
N.L.R.B. 797 (1962).
98. This assumption was reaffirmed in Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 124o-
42 (1966), in which the Board ordered employers to provide unions with the names and addresses
of employees eligible to vote in pending elections so that the union could communicate with
those employees off company premises, and in General Electric Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1247 (x966),
where the Board refused to reconsider its policy of denying equal time for union responses to captive
audience speeches stating that it preferred to wait "until after the effects of Excelsior become known."
Id. at 1251. The Board did not state how, in the absence of any procedure for gathering data, it
proposed to determine the effects of Excelsior. Nor has it since announced its findings as to those
effects.
99. 29 C.F.R. § iox.I8(a) (i974).
ioo. See Note, Union ,4uthorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 8o5, 8o6, 8i6 (1966).
ioi. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. The Board will issue a bargaining order based on
a card majority when it finds the employer to have engaged in unfair labor practices of sufficient
magnitude that a free and fair election cannot thereafter be held. See generally NLRB v. Gissel
Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 591-92 (1969).
102. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,596 (x969).
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employer who commits no unfair labor practices need not recognize a
union that possesses authorization cards signed by a majority of his em-
ployees, but may insist on an election." 3
The Board's treatment of authorization cards as compared to elections
is based on the following assumptions: (i) An employee who signs a
union authorization card does so because he wishes union representation,
unless the solicitor of his signature represents that the sole purpose of the
card is to obtain an election."0 (2) The decision to sign an authorization
card does not involve the same careful, informed consideration as the voting
decision.' 5 (3) An employee who does not sign an authorization card does
not wish union representation or is uncommitted.0
II. THE BOARD'S INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF ITS AssuMMPIONS
The Board has not applied its behavioral assumptions in a consistent
fashion. For example, the assumption that employees will infer threats or
promises from ambiguous statements has sometimes been given great
weight, while, at other times, less sensitivity has been attributed to em-
ployees.' Thus, in Birdsall Construction Co."8 the employer stated that if
the union contract increased costs, "we are certainly, as businessmen, going
to have to consider very strongly the necessity of moving our operations. ' '1o3
The Board held that this would not be interpreted as a threat."0
At times, a majority of the Board, wholly as a matter of speculation and
with no more factual data than that possessed by a previous majority, has
rejected a rule based upon one assumption in favor of a rule based upon a
contrary assumption. For example, the Board held at one time that captive
103. Linden Lumber Div., Sumner & Co., 39o N.L.R.B. 7z8 (1971), afl'd, 95 S.Ct. 429 (1974).
104. See Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268, 1269 (3963); Englewood Lumber Co.,
13o N.L.R.B. 394, 394-95 (x961); Note, Union Authorization Cards, supra note xoo, at 824.
1o5. This condusion is implicit in the decision to permit an employer who does not commit un-
fair labor practices to insist upon an election. Cf. Carson, The Gissel Doctrine: When a Bargaining
Order Will Issue, 41 Foa nm L. Rv. 85, 88-91 (1972). This assumption may, to some extent,
be premised upon a Board feeling that authorization cards are more readily procured by coercion or
fraud than are votes. See Note, Union Authorization Cards, supra note zoo, at 824-25.
Io6. The Board has never issued a bargaining order where the union has not had an authoriza-
tion card majority. The Board thus treats only card signers as counting towards the union majority
status.
. 107. See C. Monius, Tim DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, 75 (1971); Swift, NLRB Overkill: Pre-
dictions of Plant Relocation and Closure and Employer Free Speech, 8 GA. L. Rav. 77, 96-98 (1973).
xo8. 398 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (July I8, 1972).
3o9. Id. at7.
zio. The employer's statements here certainly seem no more threatening than those made by
the employer in Thomas Products Co., 367 N.L.R.B. 732 (3967). See notes 63-65 supra and accom-
panying text. On occasion, the Board has also rejected the assumption that discussion of possible future
benefits will be interpreted by employees as a promise of benefits in exchange for voting against the
union. In Coverall Rental Service, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. No. 140 (Aug. 31, 1973), the employer made
the following statement with respect to profit-sharing plans: "Your Board of Directors has been con-
sidering several of those. . . .However, as you probably understand, any improvement or promise
of improvement in our profit-sharing plan at this time might be misunderstood to be an unfair labor
practice." Id. at 3-4. The Board, in disagreement with its Regional Director, found that the state-
ment did not constitute an implied promise of benefits.
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audience speeches, absent a union opportunity to reply, were unlawful be-
cause "printed materials and individual solicitations ... do [not] . . .
approach the persuasive power of an employer's oral presentation.""' In
Livingstone Shirt Co."' it reversed itself, concluding that unions were not
unduly hindered in their organizational activities by being limited to printed
materials and individual solicitations while the employer used captive audi-
ence speeches. Changing direction again in May Department Stores Co.,"'
the Board stressed the powerful effect of a captive audience speech, dismiss-
ing all methods open to the union as "catch-as-catch-can.""
' 4
One recent example of a reversal in Board law deals with the legality of
a union's offer to waive initiation fees for those employees who signed
union authorization cards before an election. The Board originally took
the position that such waivers interfered with employee free choice on
the theory that an employee who had received a waiver would be con-
strained to vote for the union so as to receive the financial benefits of the
waiver."' Subsequently, in DIT-MCO Inc."' the Board reversed itself,
concluding that a waiver of initiation fees would not constrain an em-
ployee to vote contrary to his desires.
The Board also reversed itself in Litho Press of San Antonio,"' holding
that showing of the film And Women Must Weep was neither an unfair
labor practice nor a sufficient basis for setting aside an election. The film,
which vividly portrays strike violence,"' had been held unlawful in a series
of cases beginning with Plochman & Harrison-Cherry Lane Foods,
inc."
19
iii. Metropolitan Auto Parts, Inc., 1o2 N.L.R.B. 1634, 1636 (I953).
112. 107 N.L.R.B. 400, 406 (1953).
113. 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962).
IX4. Id. at 8oi. Technically, May Department Stores was not a reversal of Livingston Shirt Co.,
inasmuch as the former dealt with a department store, for which the Board has long had special rules,
while the latter involved a manufacturing concern. Nonetheless, the emphasis of the Board's opinion
in May was clearly contrary to that in Livingston.
x1. LoBue Bros., 3o9 N.L.R.B. 1182, 183 (1954).
zx6. 163 N.L.R.B. 3019, 1021-22 (3967).
117. 2x3 N.L.R.B. No. 143 at 3 (June 30, 1974).
xix8. For a fuller description, see Southwire Co. v. N.L.R.B., 383 F.2d 235, 239-40 (5 th Cir.
x967).
139. 14o N.L.R.B. 130, 132-33 (3962). Accord Spartus Corp., 195 N.L.R.B. 134 (972);
Hawthorn Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 253 (3967); Carl T. Mason Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 480, 483 (1963). The
theory on which the Board originally viewed the film as interfering with employee free choice, stated
briefly in Plochman & Harrison, supra, was set out in detail in Chairman McCulloch's concurring
opinion in Carl T. Mason Co., supra, at 485-86 (footnotes omitted): "The use of professionally
scripted and acted motion pictures in Board elections is a new tactical device of enormous potential
and influence. The motion picture is a much more powerful instrument than the printed or spoken
word in arousing emotions and influencing attitudes. Not only is its initial impact greater, it also has
a more lasting effect. From their experience in political elections and their reading of newspapers,
most people have learned to treat charges, statements, and promises made in political campaigns with
a measure of skepticism. They have learned that exaggerations, misstatements, and appeals to preju-
dice are an inevitable part of such campaigns, and this experience is a help in evaluating propaganda
used in Board elections.
"However, the case of motion pictures used as propaganda in electoral campaigns attendant
upon Board elections is different. There is no body of similar experience available to the ordinary
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The inconsistent application of its behavioral assumptions reflects the
Board's lack of information in two ways. First, absent empirical data, Board
members whose beliefs as to the impact of particular conduct differ from
those of their predecessors are free to assert their beliefs as fact. Second,
Board members who value highly an interest subordinated to another
under existing law can vote to change the law, rejecting the assumption on
which it rests in favor of a contrary assumption.
To cite but one example, the frequent changes in the law relating to
captive audience speeches may reflect different assumptions of new Board
members as to the impact of such speeches. More likely, however, the
change is due to the different views of new members as to the desirability
of employer freedom to campaign against unionization. Those who value
this interest highly state that employer speech has a limited impact and that
unions have ample opportunity to respond; those who view the employer
as an intruder in employee resolution of the question of union representa-
tion, or who place a high value on union representation, state the opposite.
The behavioral assumptions, then, are frequently rationalizations for con-
clusions reached on other grounds. Assumptions can be more easily manip-
ulated in this fashion when they do not rest on empirical data °
III. Tim ROLE oF Tim CouRTs
The courts have tended to defer to the Board's judgment regarding the
impact of campaign tactics on employee voting behavior. For example, the
Board's assumption that ambiguous statements are likely to be perceived as
threats was justified by Judge Learned Hand in NLRB v. Federbush Co.:
Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a communal exis-
tence; and not only does the meaning of each interpenetrate the other, but all
in their aggregate take their purport from the setting in which they are used, of
which the relation between the speaker and the hearer is perhaps the most im-
portant part. What to an outsider will be no more than the vigorous presentation
voter to permit him to evaluate such presentations. Few individuals are able to see behind the im-
pression of authenticity that a skilled director may create by the use of characters, dialogue, and
situation. A sophisticated person would probably recognize a film such as 'And Women Must
Weep' for what it is, propaganda intended to create antiunion feeling, and will appropriately weigh
or discount its one-sided and distorted message. But such films are not meant for sophisticated audi-
ences. I have no doubt that among audiences of working men and women, as well as others, 'And
Women Must Weep' is emotionally overpowering."
In overruling Carl T. Mason Co., as well as all other decisions holding "And Women Must
Weep" to constitute improper interference with employee free choice, the Board did not discuss
Chairman McCulloch's behavioral analysis.
x2o. The instability of Board rules controlling campaigning is also a function of the broad
language of the statute, which permits Board members to read their own views into the law, and the
political nature of the appointive process, which tends to produce Board members ideologically com-
mitted to the interests of labor or management. See Bok, supra note z5, at 39-42. For an interesting
defense of politically motivated changes in Board rules, see Bernstein, supra note 4, at 574 n.io.
121. 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941).
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of a conviction, to an employee may be the manifestation of a determination
which it is not safe to thwart. The Board must decide how far the second aspect
obliterates the first.1 22
On occasion the courts have taken the metaphor of laboratory condi-
tions more seriously than the Board, holding that the Board should have
set aside elections when it has not. This tendency has been particularly pro-
nounced in cases involving alleged union misrepresentations.Y In Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB... the union claimed that nine benefits were
granted to white-collar employees as a result of the union's success in secur-
ing those benefits for production workers. The union's claim was at least
arguably true as to eight of these. The Board held that the Union's propa-
ganda was "virtually accurate," but the court held otherwise.
Even if we were to assume that the first eight items, were, as a matter of fact,
negotiated for the production and maintenance workers by the Union and passed
along to the draftsmen ... item 9 did not go through that process . . . . If
truth is diluted, it is no longer truth. A glass of pure water is no longer pure if
a one-ninth part thereof is contaminated, nor is it "virtually" pure. There cannot be
"virtually" the truth any more than there can be "virtually" a virgin . 25
On other occasions the courts have viewed the Board as attributing too
great an impact to employer actions. For instance, the Board has held that
interrogation as to union sympathies is necessarily coercive unless the em-
ployer utilizes various safeguards.' While courts have accepted the Board's
basic premise, they have been more willing to find exceptions in particular
cases, with some courts treating failure to abide by the Board's safeguards
merely as evidence that the interrogation may have had a coercive im-
pact 12
7
In its decisions as to the use of union authorization cards, the Supreme
Court has accepted some of the Board's premises, rejected others, and added
assumptions of its own. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 2' the Court ac-
cepted the Board's basic assumptions about the validity of authorization
cards as an indication of employee choice. 9 The Court added two
122. Id. at 957.
123. R. WLIAMs, P. JAsus & K. HuHN, supra note .2, at 23, attribute this dose judicial scrutiny
of alleged union misrepresentations to a belief that the Board has treated unions more favorably than
employers in applying the "laboratory conditions" standard.
124. 261 F.2d 613 (7 th Cir. 1958).
125. Id. at 6x6. In Cross Baking Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346 (ist Cir. 197), the union
claimed that a competitor's employees had obtained a $.75 an hour increase under a union contract,
when in fact the increase was approximately 5.6o spread over three years. The Board found no sub-
stantial misrepresentation; the Court reversed. In Walled Lake Door Co. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d ioo
(5 th Cir. 1973), the union claimed to represent employees at four of the employer's plants, when in
fact it represented them at two. The Board dismissed the employer's objection; the court reversed.
126. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
127. NLRB v. Lorben Corp., 345 F.2d 346, 347 (2d Cir. 1965); Bourne v. NLRB, 332 F.2d
47,48 (2d Cir. x964).
128. 395 U.S. 575 (3969).
129. Id. at 602-o3.
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additional assumptions: (i) The employer will have an opportunity to
present his side of the unionization issue to employees before they sign
cards because the union will inform the employer of its organizing drive
early in the campaign.' (2) Card signers are under no greater group pres-
sure to sign and not revoke an authorization card than are other employees
to state and not vary from a voting intent. Elections are most often held in
small units in which virtually every voter's sentiments can be carefully and
individually canvassed both before and after the voting. All employees in
such elections are subject to pressures to disclose their voting intent and to
vote in accord with that intent. 1
Additional assumptions relating to union authorization cards were set
out in NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co.,. in which the Supreme Court held that a
union's offer to waive initiation fees for all employees who sign cards be-
fore an election interferes with employee free choice. Here the Court as-
sumed: (i) Some employees who do not wish union representation will
sign cards to avoid the initiation fee in the event the union wins the elec-
tion."' (2) Some card-signers will feel obliged to carry through on their
stated intention to support the union, even though they continue to oppose
union representation.3 (3) Obtaining authorization cards helps the union
win the election because the signed cards will be taken by employees to be
an indication of the union's support by their fellows; if the amount of this
support is not accurately reflected by the cards, employees may be misled
into voting for the union.' (4) The "fist in the velvet glove" theory of Ex-
change Parts.. applies to the waiver of initiation fees as an inducement to
card-signing because "[t]he failure to sign a recognition slip may well seem
ominous to nonunionists who fear that if they do not sign they will face a
wrathful union regime, should the union win."'37
IV. POLITICAL VOTER STUDIES AND ATTrTUDE CHANGE RESEARCH
The Board's assumptions about the influence of campaigning on voter
behavior in representation elections are not wholly consistent with the find-
ings of social scientists studying the effects of influence attempts in other
settings. Indeed, the Board's central assumption-that the employee voter,
I3O. The Court predicated this assumption on the union's desire to subject the employer to the
unfair labor practice provisions of the Act. "[T] he union must be able to show the employer's aware-
ness of the drive in order to prove that his contemporaneous conduct constituted unfair labor prac-
tices on which a bargaining order can be based if the drive is ultimately successful." Id. at 6o3.
131. /d. at 604.
132. 414 U.S. 270 (1973).
133. Id. at 275.
134. Id. at 277-78.
135. Id. at 277.
136. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (z964).
137. NLRB v. Savair Mfg. CO., 414 U.S. 270,28 (i973).
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in weighing the merits of union representation, will attend to and be sig-
nificantly influenced by the campaigns of the parties-is contrary to the
findings of the political voter studies.' Most voters in political elections
make their final decision before the campaign. In their study of the i96o
presidential campaign, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet found that 50 per-
cent of the voters had made up their minds six months before the election
and 75 percent had done so shortly after the candidates were chosen.39
Furthermore, the political vote is not determined by a reasoned choice care-
fully calculated from the candidates' stands on the issues in the immediate
campaign, but primarily by ethnic, class, and family influences which pre-
date and transcend the issues. 4 The implicit model of the omnicompetent
citizen who attends to the campaign and carefully weighs alternative posi-
tions in the process of making his voting decision is not even an accurate
characterization of the political voter.'
The empirical studies of political elections have demonstrated over-
whelmingly that people have well-formed political predispositions, and
that the campaigns are for the most part ineffective in influencing people
to vote contrary to those predispositions. The political campaign appears
to have two primary effects. For those who make up their minds early,
the campaign may provide a rationale for their decision. For those who
delay their voting decision, the campaign appears primarily to activate
latent predispositions.4" Since most political voters make early and firm
decisions, investigations of campaign effectiveness have focused on those
voters who report themselves to be undecided, or who switch from support-
ing one candidate to another during the course of the campaign. The re-
search shows that the model of the openminded voter is not an appropriate
characterization of the undecided voters; they have fewer opinions on
issues and are less likely to participate in election events or expose them-
selves to political communications than voters whose decisions are made
early.' Similarly, the switchers have been found to be "the least interested
in the election; the least concerned about its outcome; the least attentive to
political material in the formal media of communication; the last to settle
upon a vote decision; and the most likely to be persuaded, finally, by a
personal contact, not an 'issue' of the election." 4'
138. See Bok, supra note 15, at 48.
139. P. LAZAESFELD, B. BERELSEN & H. GAUDET, TH PEOPLE'S CHOICE 54 (paperback ed.
x968).
r40. Cf. A. CAMPBELL, P. CONVERSE, W. MILLER & D. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER 86-87,
384-2o9 (1964).
141. Sears, Political Behavior, in 5 TH-E HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 324-37 (G. Lindzey
& E. Aronson eds., 2d ed. 3969).
142. P. LAzARSFELD, B. BERELSEN & H. GAuDET, supra note 139, at 83.
X43. Id. at 56.
144. Id. at 59.
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To be sure, results from the political studies may not apply to union
representation elections. The employee voter may have a less powerful
predisposition for or against union representation than the political voter
has for or against the major political parties, a factor that might increase
the proportion of initially undecided voters. On the other hand, it is un-
likely that employees have no well-formed attitudes regarding their wages,
hours, and working conditions 45 Moreover, very intense attitudes should be
formed by direct experience such as working for the employer who is a
party in the election. It is also possible that many employees already have
well-formed attitudes toward unions resulting from union membership
on previous jobs or information acquired from family members, friends,
and the mass media.
The primary distinction between political elections and union represen-
tation elections has long been thought to lie in the employees' economic de-
pendence on their employer.4  The employer's power to administer sanc-
tions, whether positive or negative, provides him with an effective source
of influence. The Board assumes that if an employer invokes his economic
power, employees initially favoring union representation will switch and
vote against the union. The empirical research on communicator power
and influence attempts, however, indicates that achieving behavior change
is not always so simple. In order for an influence attempt to be effective, the
employee must be exposed to it, understand its meaning, know what be-
haviors will demonstrate his compliance, and believe that the employer can
and will monitor compliance. 47 The avoidance or selective perception of
X45. The political studies have found that voters become more involved when the issues of
the campaign are economic and personally salient. For example, the unexpectedly high political in-
volvement of farmers in the X956 presidential election has been interpreted as a reaction to economic
conditions. A. CnIPBELL, P. CONVEs, W. MILLER & D. STosras, supra note 14o, at 220. If the
saliency of economic issues leads to increased involvement, one should expect, as is true, higher vot-
ing rates in union representation elections than political elections. In fiscal 1973, votes were cast
t by 89 percent of all eligible employees in NLRB elections. 38 NLRB ANN. REP. 24r (1973). But,
drawing the parallel further, those people who demonstrate high interest levels form early and stable
vote intentions. P. LAZARSFELD, B. BEaREsEN & H. GAUnaT, supra note 139, at 53, 67. They may
be more attentive to the campaign, but their high intake of campaign propaganda appears to insulate
them from switching, not influence them to switch. It is thus unlikely that the greater salience of
the issues to the voters in a union representation election makes the preelection campaign a more sig-
nificant element in influencing vote switch than in a political election.
X46. Dean Theodore J. St. Antoine has stated: "[E]mployee fear ...takes this whole ques-
tion completely outside the area with which we are used to dealing in political elections. . . Think
of a man whose whole livelihood is dependent upon a particular job. That is the loss he faces. This
factor may vary. I can imagine that in the city of Pittsburgh an employer could make a certain kind
of speech, using the language a lawyer has taken out of a book as being approved in past NLRB elec-
tions. He might not cause the least bit of fear in the employees listening to that speech. . . .But there
are other places in our country where the identical speech would have a totally different impact. Out
on the Great Plains, for example, you can get into a little town where one proprietary employer holds
sway as economic emperor. In that little town the banker, the newspaper, the sheriff, and the entire
community dance to the tune that employer calls. There, fear can be pervasive... .. SouTmassiu;
LEGAL FOUNDATION, PROCEEDINGS OF ELEvENTH ANNUAL INsTtrruE ON LABOR LAW 244-45 (1965).
147. See McGuire, The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change, in 3 THE HANDsooit OF
SOCIAL PsYcHoLooy 194-96 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson eds., 2d ed. 1969).
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communications which challenge one's opinions is well documented."
Employees who favor union representation may well anticipate that the in-
formation in an employer speech or letter will be nonsupportive. Such an
influence attempt is likely to be avoided altogether; but if the employee is
exposed to it, he may misperceive, suppress, or forget the information. 4"
The research on perceptual distortion also indicates that when a per-
son is exposed to a communication which is discrepant from his own posi-
tion on an issue, he is likely to see that communication as even more dis-
crepant than it is."' Thus a union supporter might very well interpret an
employer's ambiguous statements as implied threats or promises. But the
Board's assumption that the union supporter will react to a threat or prom-
ise with a vote switch is inconsistent with the studies finding that people
tend to reject the source of a communication which is very discrepant
from their own position rather than changing their position."' For instance,
employer threats of reprisal may be calculated to arouse fear and thus in-
hibit employees from participating in union activities. But the threat may
not be intimidating if the employee rejects the likelihood that the em-
ployer will carry out the threat, either because the employer's threat is con-
sidered unlawful-he cannot do that-or the employer is seen as making
idle threats-he will not do that.
Even if the communication does arouse a very high level of fear, it does
not necessarily follow that the influence attempt will be successful. The
greatest amount of behavior change may occur with moderate levels of
fear. Under conditions of low fear, the pro-union employee may be un-
affected by the employer's influence attempt. Under conditions of high
fear, the employee may conclude that he needs the union for protection. "2
One condition which might affect the impact of an employer's influence
is the degree to which employees are aware of the employer's intent. Union
supporters are likely to be sensitive to the employer's purpose. While such
sensitivity might heighten perception of the influence attempt, some studies
suggest it might serve to minimize its impact. The effectiveness of the
148. H.C. Tah-amis, A'rrUDE AND A'rrrruD CHAGaa (1971). Triandis concludes that there is
clear evidence of de facto selectivity but that the research suggests selectivity is not a general psycho-
logical phenomenon.
149. Id. at 156.
150. See McGuire, supra note 147, at 222.
151. Id. at 223.
152. H.C. TRaaNsis, supra note 148, at i92-92. This curvilinear relationship between fear
arousal and persuasion is controversial, however. One review of the literature concludes that most
of the recent studies have found a positive relationship between fear and persuasion. Higbee, Fifteen
Years of Fear Arousal: Research on Threat Appeals: 1953-1968, PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 426 (1969).
Nevertheless, a discriminatorily discharged employee may become a martyr. See Arbie Mineral Feed
Co. v. NLRB, 438 F.2d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 197); NLRB v. Crystal Tire Co., 41o F.2d 916, 920 (8th
Cir. 2969); Bok, supra note 15, at 41.
153. See McGuire, supra note 147, at 185. In the case where the appropriate behavior change
is ambiguous or unclear, however, prewarning may clarify what behaviors are appropriate and
actually increase the degree of change.
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promised or granted reward should also vary with its value to the em-
ployee, the degree to which it is related to the motivation for unionization,
and, in the instance of a promise, the perceived likelihood of fulfillment.
An employee may interpret a promise in light of previous unfulfilled
employer promises and not be influenced 5 " Or, he may distort the intent
of the promise or grant of benefit to support his prior opinion, thinking that
if the employer will promise or grant this kind of benefit when a union is
only a threat, he would be likely to grant even greater benefits if union rep-
resentation became a reality. 55
Still another factor relevant to the effect of an employer influence at-
tempt is the degree to which the employer can and does monitor compli-
ance."5 6 Scrutiny of overt union organizational activity is not difficult, and
the employer may seek no more: if overt union activity ceases, union sup-
porters may view the union as ineffective and vote against it. The em-
ployer's ultimate goal, however, is to influence voting, which occurs under
circumstances most difficult to scrutinize-a secret ballot election conducted
by a government agency. The employer's power to bring about the behavior
he desires may be significantly lessened by the employees' belief in the se-
crecy of the ballot-if, that is, they believe the ballot to be secret.
On the other hand, the secrecy of the ballot, even if accepted by em-
ployees, may not insulate them against the employer's efforts to influence
their group decision. Empirical research indicates that group pressure for
compliance will increase when rewards or sanctions are defined so that all
members of the group share a common fate' 7 If employees believe that the
employer will reward or sanction the group as a whole based on the elec-
tion outcome, they may influence each other to vote against union represen-
tation'5
V. CONCLUSION
The Board's basic assumptions about employee voting behavior, to the
extent that they can be discerned from a somewhat inconsistent course of
decisions, flow from the view that the employee voter acts on the basis of an
informed and reasoned judgment, voting to further his own best interests.
He is attentive to the campaign, from which he receives most of his infor-
154. See id. at 182, 195.
155. One union representative has so stated: "In an effort to defeat the union in organizational
campaigns, the companies have given wage increases prior to the representation election. Instead of
buying the vote of the youth, it has served only to whet his appetite. He votes for the union more
readily, for he is convinced with the power of the union he can do at least twice as well no later
than the first week following the election." Speech by M.C. Weston, Jr., Director of United Steel
Workers, District 35, Labor Relations Problems Created by the Expectations of Young Workers, 75
L.R.R. 28i, 282 (1970).
156. See McGuire, supra note 147, at 194.
157. Id. at 195.
x58. Id.
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mation about union-management relationships, and by which he is power-
fully influenced. The susceptibility to campaign influence is related to his
economic dependence on the employer. As a result of this dependence, he
is likely to interpret the employer's statements as containing promises of
benefit if he rejects the union or threats of reprisal if he does not. Even if
he previously favored union representation, he will react to those promises
or threats, or to their effectuation, by voting against the union. The Board
has developed rules designed to prevent the employer from trading on his
economic strength. The Board also seeks to prevent both employer and
union from utilizing emotional appeals deemed capable of interfering
with the employee's ability to make a free and reasoned choice.
While the studies of voting in political elections, attitude change, and
the effects of persuasive communications raise doubts about the validity
of the Board's behavioral assumptions, they are by no means conclusive.
Research focused directly on behavior in union representation elections
is necessary to determine the validity of the Board's assumptions.
Empirical validation of the Board's behavioral assumption is called
for especially in view of the nature of the regulation engaged in by the
Board. Many of the questions regarding permissible campaign behavior
which come to the Board for decision ultimately turn on a resolution
of legitimate competing interests. Balancing those interests can be an ex-
ceedingly difficult task, frequently amounting to a value judgment about
the strengths of the competing concerns. In the absence of empirical data,
there exists a tendency to mask value judgments behind assertions about
the impact of campaign tactics on voting behavior. The result is that sig-
nificant questions of policy are not faced squarely, but dissipate into fruit-
less contradictory suppositions about impact. The availability of empirical
data could serve to bring these policy disputes into the open.
The availability of empirical data on the impact of campaigning will
not, of itself, be sufficient to resolve all questions as to the appropriate con-
tent and scope of Board regulations. Conduct found not to exercise a sig-
nificant influence on employee voting behavior may nonetheless be forbid-
den for other reasons. Attempts to influence employees by threats or prom-
ises may be proscribed to serve the symbolic function of demonstrating the
existence of a national policy disapproving of such behavior. While cur-
rent forms of campaigning may not be effective in coercing employees to
vote contrary to their desires, the withdrawal of governmental regulation
might encourage more vigorous efforts that would be effective. Finally,
some of the Board's rules do not rest, to any significant extent, on assump-
tions as to impact, but on a desire to preserve the appearance of fairness in
the Board's election processes.
On the other hand, Board regulation of campaigning is not without
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costs. The Board's caseload has risen dramatically in recent years. 9 Regu-
lation of election campaigns contributes substantially to this caseload.'6
Commentators have suggested that the Board's caseload has lowered the
quality of its decisions and impaired its overall enforcement of the Act. 1"
The parties, too, pay the costs of governmental campaign regulation, both
through the financial burden of litigating election challenges and in the
delay and consequent industrial instability that may result before the ques-
tion of union representation is finally resolved. In determining whether the
gains of governmental regulation of campaign conduct justify these costs,
the question whether that conduct actually influences voting behavior is
clearly relevant." 2
159. At the dose of fiscal year X973, there were 12,308 cases pending before the Board out of
41,077 received. 38 NLRB ANN. REP. 203 (1973). Comparable figures for 1969 were 9,992 pending
cases out of 31,303 received, 34 NLRB ANN. REP. x96 (x969), and for 1965, 8,911 pending
cases of 28,025 received, 3o NLRB ANN. REP. 177 (1965).
16o. In fiscal x973, objections were filed in 1,138 of 9,66o elections conducted. 38 NLRB AsN.
REP. 226, 228 (1973).
161. R. WLIS, P. JANus & K. HuHN, supra note 1", at 438; Bok, supra note 15, at 6o-6i;
Samoff, supra note x5, at 238-39.
162. A subsequent article will present data bearing on some of the Board's assumptions and a
discussion of the implications of the findings for future Board regulation.
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